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Abstract
This paper develops a model of luxury goods by incorporating weakly
non-separable, recursive preferences. In a two-good framework, a quasi-luxury is
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Countries which have sumptuary laws, are generally poor. (Sir
Dudley North, Discourses Upon Trade, 1691, p. 14)
1 Introduction
By de…nition, the wealthier allocate higher proportions of their expenditures
to luxuries than the poorer do. The standard price theory (see, e.g., Deaton
andMuellbauer (1983)) would describe this by saying that the richer consume
more luxuries because they have more wealth. In dynamic consumer theory,
however, the statement is not perfect: how much wealth consumers accumu-
late is a part of their lifetime utility-maximization problem, as is how much
of each good they consume in each period. Comprehensive understanding of
luxury expenditures entails dynamic analysis.
This paper develops a dynamic theory of luxury consumption, focusing
on the bilateral relationship between luxury and wealth accumulation. Par-
ticularly emphasized is the causal e¤ect that pursuit of luxury goods has on
wealth accumulation. The topic of how preferences for luxury goods a¤ect
the total amount of national wealth goes back to at least the era of David
Hume and Adam Smith.1 The paper is a tentative response to their question
using modern consumption theory. Based on the procedures used by Shi
(1994), weakly non-separable preferences are speci…ed in a simple two-good
model of recursive preferences, such that the intratemporal marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between two goods depends on the future consumption
streams through current welfare.2 Relative preferences for the two goods,
measured by the MRS, then depend on current welfare and hence current
wealth holdings. With the resultant non-homothetic preference structure, a
good whose MRS is increasing (decreasing) in wealth is called a quasi-luxury
(quasi-necessity). Under a certain condition, quasi-luxuries are identical to
luxury goods. The purposes of the present paper are (i) to characterize lux-
ury goods from the viewpoint of intertemporal resource allocation; and (ii)
1See Brewer (1998) and Mason (1998).
2Weakly non-separable preferences under recursive preferences are analyzed by several
authors (e.g., Lucas and Stokey (1984), Judd (1985), Epstein, Ham, and Zin (1988), Shi
(1994), Ikeda (2001)). Shi conducts the most systematic analysis to discuss the intertem-
poral leisure-consumption choice under distortionary taxation on capital and labor. By
applying his analysis to a small-country model with two traded goods, Ikeda (2001) shows
that, in contrast to the literature, a terms-of-trade deterioration can worsen the current
account, i.e., the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler e¤ect can take place.
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to show that wealth accumulation and distribution depend on consumers’
intratemporal preferences for these luxury goods.
Quasi-luxuries are characterized by two properties. First, consumers wait
for quasi-luxury consumption more (less) patiently than for quasi-necessity
when they expect to be happier (unhappier) in the future. This property
helps to understand consistently two contrasting patterns of luxury consump-
tion that are commonly observed: Some people save luxuries today to enjoy
tomorrow, while other people enjoy luxurious lives today by loans and live
on necessity goods tomorrow to pay back their debts. Which pattern takes
place depends on the future course of the welfare of consumers.
Second, given constant market prices, strong preferences for quasi-luxury
goods are shown to promote consumers’ optimal wealth accumulation. Al-
ternatively stated, quasi-luxury induces a preference for wealth. This saving-
promoting property of quasi-luxury preferences is then applied to the mod-
els of neoclassical growth and a two-country world economy, showing two
main results: (i) the stronger the quasi-luxury preference, the more capital
is accumulated in steady state; and (ii) even if production ‡ows and utility-
discounting functions are both internationally (interpersonally) identical, a
country with a stronger quasi-luxury preference holds more wealth in the long
run than a country with a weaker preference. As a corollary of (i), luxury
taxes harm growth, as Sir Dudley North pointed out more than three cen-
turies ago (see the epigraph). From (ii) and continuity, a less-patient country
with a stronger quasi-luxury preference can be wealthier than a more-patient
one.
Although there are strong empirical evidences against preference homo-
theticity (e.g., Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994), Attanasio and We-
ber (1995), and Parker (1999)), homothetic preferences have usually been
assumed for simplicity in dynamic consumer theory, and few attempts have
been made to analyze luxury consumption from the viewpoint of intertempo-
ral utility maximization.3; 4 Browning and Crossley (2000), in an important
3Besley (1989) proposes a new de…nition for luxury which is useful in “dynamic” ap-
plications. However, dynamic optimization is not discussed there. Baland and Ray (1991)
examine the e¤ect of capital accumulation on unemployment by using a model in which
luxury and basic goods compete for the use of the scarce resources. However, the analysis
is essentially static, assuming that capital accumulation is exogenous.
4There are several important contributions to dynamic macroeconomics that can be
reinterpreted in the luxury-necessity terms. For example, in the status (wealth)-seeking
literature (e.g., Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), Corneo and Jeanne (1999)), a high
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exception using a two-good, two-period model of the time-additive utility
function, show that luxury goods have higher elasticities of intertemporal
substitution and hence are easier to postpone than necessity goods. This
paper re-examines this issue in the recursive preference framework by relat-
ing quasi-luxury goods to luxury goods. My contribution in this regard is
the …nding that luxury goods can be featured by the relative magnitudes of
good-speci…c time preferences as well as of good-speci…c intertemporal sub-
stitution elasticities. Even when good x is not easier to postpone than good
c, it turns out that x can be a luxury good if consumers are more patient
with respect to x than with respect to c when they are getting happier, i.e.,
if it is a quasi-luxury.
In the dynamic macro literature, international (interpersonal) wealth dis-
tribution has been explained by referring to di¤erences in four determinants:
(i) the subjective discount rate (e.g., Ramsey (1928), Devereux and Shi
(1991)); (ii) productivity growth (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996), Frenkel
and Razin (1992)); (iii) age structures (e.g., Buiter (1981), Obstfeld and Ro-
go¤ (1996), Frenkel and Razin (1992)); and (iv) random income ‡uctuation
(e.g., Clarida (1990), Becker and Zilcha (1997)). To focus on implications
of the luxury preference, these factors are not considered. The punch line
of my result lies in the …nding that wealth accumulation is still a¤ected by
intratemporal preferences for luxury.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
framework to de…ne (quasi-) luxury goods, and analyses the relation between
preferences for them and consumers’ optimal wealth accumulation. Section
3 considers implications of the luxury preference for economic growth by
using a simple neoclassical model. In section 4, the analysis is extended to a
two-country economy model, where a box diagram is introduced to aid the
discussions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
“status” can be regarded as a luxury good, so that the preference for luxury is growth
promoting. Our result di¤ers from theirs in that the wealth preference is induced by
preferences for usual-marketed commodities, instead of for non-marketed goods such as
status and marriage.
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2 Consumption behavior with quasi-luxury goods
2.1 Consumer preferences and quasi-luxury goods
Consider in…nitely lived consumers. There are two distinct consumption
goods c and x. Let u (c; x) be the instantaneous utility function of a repre-
sentative consumer. The u (c; x) is assumed to satisfy the regularity condi-
tions such as concavity, monotonicity, and the Inada condition. Preferences
of consumers are given by the following lifetime utility function:
U (0) ´
Z 1
0
u(c (t) ; x (t)) exp (¡¢(t))dt; (1)
where
¢(t) =
Z t
0
± (c (s) ; x (s))ds; (2)
with ± (¢; ¢) (> 0) representing the instantaneous subjective discount rate. As
in the literature (e.g., Uzawa (1968)), ±c > 0 and ±x > 0 are assumed, where
±c = @±=@c, etc. Letting Á (t) denote the time-t lifetime utility U (t), the
corresponding generating function g is given by
g (c; x; Á) = u (c; x)¡ Á± (c; x) ;
with which utility evolution is expressed as
_Á = ¡g (c; x; Á) s.t. lim
t!1
Á (t) exp (¡¢(t)) = 0; (3)
where a dot represents the time derivative, i.e., _Á (t) =dÁ (t) =dt. The …rst-
order partial derivatives gc and gx equal the current-value marginal utilities
of c (t) and x (t) de…ned in terms of the Voltera derivative. It is assumed
that gc and gx are positive. The intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between c and x is given by dc=dxjU(0)=const: = gx=gc (c; x; Á).
When the MRS indeed depends on current utility level Á, consumer pref-
erences are not weakly separable since the choice of the time-t consumption
basket depends on future consumption plans. With the preferences, which are
called by Shi (1994) weakly non-separable preferences, I de…ne quasi-luxury
goods as follows:
De…nition: A good is a quasi-luxury (-necessity) good or simply a
quasi-luxury (-necessity) to a consumer if and only if (i¤) his or her
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relative preferences for it, measured by the MRS, are increasing (decreasing)
in wealth.
It is convenient if the non-separability index » is de…ned as
» (c; x; Á) ´ 1
gx=gc
@ (gx=gc)
@Á
=
±c
gc
¡ ±x
gx
;
where the following relations are assumed:
Assumption 1:
gcx = 0; gcc < 0; gxx < 0;
±gcc
g2c
< » < ¡±gxx
g2x
:
The last three inequalities ensure the local concavity of the preference.5;6
The index » captures how relative preferences for the two goods depend on
current welfare and hence on current wealth. Without loss of generality, let
us assume the following:
Assumption 2: Good x is a quasi-luxury good:
» (c; x; Á) > 0:
From the de…nition of », the MRS gx=gc for the quasi-luxury x along the
indi¤erence curve is larger than that along the discount rate, ±x=±c, implying
that consumers are more reluctant to sacri…ce x for c to keep lifetime utility
constant than to keep the discount rate constant:
dc
dx
¯¯¯¯
U(0)=const.
>
dc
dx
¯¯¯¯
±=const.
:
Put otherwise, to increase quasi-luxury x in exchange for quasi-necessity c,
keeping the discount rate constant, improves lifetime utility and underlying
wealth positions. This property plays an important role for consumers’ quasi-
luxury preferences to a¤ect wealth accumulation.
5See Shi (1994, appendix).
6The index » would be zero if the discount rate ± were a function of felicity u, as in
Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld (1982), or if ± were constant, as in the case of time-additive
preference, or if u were constant, as in Epstein and Hynes (1983).
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Taking the good c as numeraire, let p be the relative price of the quasi-
luxury, r the interest rate, and a the consumer’s total wealth, which may
be composed of …nancial wealth and human capital. Consumers maximize
lifetime utility (1) subject to four constraints: (i) the ‡ow budget constraint,
_a (t) = r (t) a (t)¡ c (t)¡ p (t)x (t) ; (4)
(ii) the law of motion (2) for the discount factor; (iii) the initial condition,
a0 =given; and (iv) the positivity condition on a. Letting ¸ denote the
current-value shadow price of savings, the optimal conditions are given by:
gc (c; Á) (´ uc (c; x)¡ Á±c (c; x)) = ¸;
gx (x; Á) =gc (c; Á) = p; (5)
_¸ = (± (c; x)¡ r)¸;
and the transversality conditions for a and Á.
The optimal dynamics for (a; c; x; Á; ¸) are generated by …ve equations
(3), (4), and (5) under the initial and transversality conditions. To reduce
the system, de…ne the rate of time preference ½c with respect to c as
½c ´ ¡d ln gc (c (t) ; Á (t)) exp(¡¢(t))
dt
¯¯¯¯
_c=0
;
where gc exp(¡¢) represents the present-value marginal utility of c: Then,
the …rst and third equations in (5) can be reduced to
_c = ¡ gc
gcc
(r ¡ ½c (c; x; Á)) ; (6)
where
½c (c; x; Á) = ± (c; x)¡ ±c (c; x)
gc (c; Á)
g (c; x; Á) : (7)
In exactly the same way, the optimal dynamics of quasi-luxury consumption
can be obtained by de…ning the rate of time preference ½x with respect to x.
From (5), the dynamics are not independent of (6).
By comparing (7) with the corresponding equation for good x, quasi-
luxury goods can be characterized from the viewpoint of impatience: from
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(3) and the de…nition of », the di¤erence between the two good-speci…c time
preferences satis…es
½c ¡ ½x = » _Á;
which, under Assumption 3, implies ½x Q ½c as _Á R 0. This characterizes
quasi-luxuries as follows:
Proposition 1: When welfare is improving (deteriorating) over time, con-
sumers are more (less) patient with respect to quasi-luxury consumption than
with respect to quasi-necessity consumption.
Alternatively stated, consumers can wait for consuming quasi-luxuries
more patiently than for consuming quasi-necessities when they expect to be
happier or wealthier in the future, whereas they cannot when getting unhap-
pier or poorer. This describes well our daily consumption behavior towards
luxuries. For example, many young people with poor future prospects often
enjoy outrageous luxurious consumption (luxurious suits, brand-new cars,
expensive restaurant dinners with friends, etc.) by using credit cards and, at
the same time, save daily necessity consumption (living in cheap apartment
rooms, having junk food for daily dinners, etc.). The “Last Supper” might
well have been luxurious since the su¤erings on the cross were expected next
day. People tend to spend large portions of unlabored lucky income, e.g.,
lottery prizes, poker, etc., on luxuries.7 In contrast, many entrepreneurs
and professional sports players likely save luxury consumption when young,
instead of enjoying luxuries by loans, to accumulate human and nonhuman
capital, until they can a¤ord to enjoy luxurious lives in the future.8 Upon
an unexpected unlucky expense, consumers usually decrease more luxuries
than necessities. These two contrasting consumption patterns, i.e., consum-
ing more luxuries today and less tomorrow than necessities, or consuming
less luxuries today and more tomorrow, can be rationalized consistently by
Proposition 1: either pattern can take place, depending on whether the con-
sumer’s welfare state is deteriorating or improving, or whether he or she is
happier or unhappier than expected to be in the future.
7In this sense, “ill got, ill spent” could be regarded as rational behavior.
8Likewise, during World War II, Japanese people saved luxury consumption under the
slogan: “Luxury is our enemy!”.
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2.2 Optimal consumption
Given the market prices (p; r) and the initial total wealth a0, the optimal
consumption plan fa (t) ; c (t) ; x (t) ; Á (t)g1t=0 for the consumer is generated
by (3), (4), and (5). The steady-state consumption basket (¹c; ¹x) is determined
by
± (¹c; ¹x) = r; (8)
and
gx (¹x; u (¹c; ¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x))
gc (¹c; u (¹c; ¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x))
= p: (9)
Steady-state wealth holding and welfare are then given by
r¹a = ¹c+ p¹x; (10)
and
¹Á = u (¹c; ¹x) =r;
respectively.
Figure 1 depicts the determination of the steady-state consumption plan.
Schedule RR0 represents (8), depicting the locus of (¹c; ¹x) that equalizes the
steady-state rate of time preference to a given interest rate. It could be
referred to as the steady-state time preference curve. Schedule FF 0 is a locus
along which the MRS between the two goods is equal to the corresponding
relative price. The steady-state consumption basket (¹c; ¹x) is determined at
the intersection point E of the two schedules. With the consumption basket,
the no-savings condition (10) is depicted as schedule AA0 which goes through
point E with slope ¡1=p. Its horizontal intercept gives the steady-state total
wealth holding ¹a.
The property of quasi-luxury goods is illustrated by noting from (5) that
the slope of schedule AA0 should equal the gradient gd=gf at point E of the
steady-state indi¤erence curve I (E):
I (E) =
½
(¹c; ¹x) j u (¹c; ¹x)
± (¹c; ¹x)
= utility at E
¾
: (11)
Therefore, for good x to be a quasi-luxury good, as in Assumption 2, the slope
of the AA0 schedule, ¡1=p (= ¡gc=gx) should be smaller than the gradient
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at point E of schedule RR0, i.e., ¡±c=±x. This property plays a crucial role
for the quasi-luxury preference to promote wealth accumulation. Figure 1
is similar to the usual map for static consumption choice, except that the
location of the “budget schedule” AA0 is endogenously determined to …nance
the consumption basket (¹c; ¹x) that is determined by schedules RR0 and FF 0.
The resultant steady-state wealth holdings re‡ect preferences for the two
goods as well as time preference.
An autonomous local dynamic system can be obtained with respect to
n ´ (c; Á; b) by substituting (5) into (3), (4), and (6) and linearizing the
resulting system around steady state as _n (t) = An^ (t), where the coe¢cient
matrix A is given in Appendix A; and the hat above variable n represents
deviations from the steady-state value of the variable. As is also shown in
the appendix, the linear system has two positive roots and one negative root
!:
! ´
r ¡
q
r2 + 4g
2
cg
2
x
gccgxx
ª
2
;
where
ª ´ ¡
½
»2 +
r±c±x
gcgx
µ
gcc
±cgc
+
gxx
±xgx
¶¾
;
which can be shown to be positive under Assumption 1. Any other paths than
the saddle path governed by ! cannot satisfy the transversality conditions.
The optimal consumption plan is uniquely determined on the saddle arm,
which can be derived from the eigen vector associated with ! as:
c^ (t) =
g2x
(gxx + p2gcc)
½
gxx (r ¡ !)
g2x
+ »
¾
a^ (t) ;
x^ (t) =
gxgc
(gxx + p2gcc)
½
gcc (r ¡ !)
g2c
¡ »
¾
a^ (t) ; (12)
and
Á^ (t) = gca^ (t) ;
where the state variable a (t) evolves by _a (t) = !a^ (t) subject to a^ (0) =
a0 ¡ ¹a:
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As total wealth holding monotonically approaches its steady-state quan-
tity from a given a0, the transitional paths for consumptions c and x and
welfare Á are determined on stable arms (12). Under Assumption 1, the sta-
ble arms are all positively-sloping: consumptions c and x as well as lifetime
utility Á co-move positively with net foreign assets b. That is, the two goods
are normal.
2.3 The Engel curve and luxury goods
Based on the above analysis, quasi-luxury goods are related to luxury goods.
In considering luxury goods in a dynamic setting, two points should be noted:
…rst, relevant income in considering consumption baskets is not usual cur-
rent income but permanent income, i.e., income from total wealth; second,
however, total wealth is an endogenous variable in the intertemporal con-
sumption choice setting. It is proposed that luxury goods be de…ned on the
saddle arm (12).
By eliminating a^ from the …rst two equations in (12), a positively-sloping
saddle trajectory in the (c; x)-space is obtained as
x^ (t) =
gc
gx
½
gcc (r ¡ !)
g2c
¡ »
¾½
gxx (r ¡ !)
g2x
+ »
¾¡1
c^ (t) : (13)
This schedule depicts positive co-movements of c and x generated by (en-
dogenous) wealth variation. This can be regarded as the wealth-consumption
curve or the Engel curve de…ned with respect to total wealth or permanent
income. The Engel curve is also illustrated in …gure 1. Luxury goods are
de…ned along this schedule:
De…nition: A good is a luxury (necessity) good or simply a luxury (ne-
cessity) to a consumer i¤, for given constant market prices (p; r) and initial
total wealth a0, the consumption share of the good in the consumer’s total
expenditure is increasing (decreasing) in total wealth along the Engel curve
(13).9 ; 10
9To be precise, it should be called a (p; r)-luxury good, for example, because how
optimal consumption baskets depend on wealth depends on (p; r) :
10Hamermesh (1982) estimates the permanent-income elasticities of various
consumptions.
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Along the Engel curve (13), dlnpxdlnc =
°c+c»=(r¡!)
p°x¡px»=(r¡!) , where °
c ´ ¡cgcc=gc
and °x ´ ¡xgxx=gx represent the measures of the desire to smooth consump-
tions c and x, respectively.11 The identity c
z
dlnc
dlnz +
px
z
dlnpx
dlnz = 1 implies
dlnpx
dlnz
=
µ
px
c
+
p°x ¡ px»= (r ¡ !)
°c + c»= (r ¡ !)
¶¡1 ³px
c
+ 1
´
:
It thus follows:
d (px=z)
da
R 0, »z
r ¡ ! + (°
c ¡ p°x) R 0;
which can be summarized by:
Proposition 2: The quasi-luxury good x is a luxury good i¤
»z
r ¡ ! + (°
c ¡ p°x) > 0;
implying that quasi-luxuries are likely to be luxuries in the sense that a quasi-
luxury is a luxury good unless the degree °x of the desire to smooth the x
consumption times p is much larger than that °c to smooth c:
Remark 1: By using a time-additive utility function over two-period con-
sumption, Browning and Crossley (2000) proved that luxury goods have a
higher intertemporal substitution elasticity (ISE) and hence are easier to
postpone than necessities. Since the reciprocals of °c and °x equal the ISEs
with respect to goods c and x, respectively, Proposition 2 could be regarded
as an extension of their analysis to the recursive preference framework. In
the setting, a good can be a luxury, even if it has a lower ISE, provided it is
quasi-luxurious, that is so long as consumers are more patient with respect
to the good with the lower ISE than with respect to the other.
Proposition 2 can be interpreted intuitively by recalling the Euler equa-
tion (6). From the de…nition (7) of time preference, the optimal consumption
ratio of the two goods evolve according to:
¢
ln (px=c) =
1
p°x
(r ¡ ½x)¡ 1
°c
(r ¡ ½c)
= r
µ
1
p°x
¡ 1
°c
¶
+
µ
1
°c
½c ¡ 1
p°x
½x
¶
:
11Epstein (1987, p. 76) uses a similar terminology.
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From Proposition 1, when the utility index Á increases over time, consumers
are more patient with respect to quasi-luxury x than with respect to quasi-
necessity c (i.e., ½x < ½c). Proposition 2 thus implies that, if the ISEs are the
same between the two goods, the x-c consumption ratio increases as total
wealth a increases over time. On the other hand, if x and c were neither
quasi-luxury nor quasi-necessity, i.e., when » = 0, the x-c consumption ratio
is increasing in a if and only if x is easier to postpone than c; i.e., i¤ 1=p°x >
1=°c, as is shown by Browning and Crossley.
In sum, there are two factors that determine whether a good is a luxury
or a necessity: inter-commodity di¤erences in ISE, and time preference. By
considering quasi-luxury goods, the role of the second factor is focused on.
As shown later, it is luxury preferences induced by this factor that play an
important role in promoting wealth accumulation.
2.4 The preference for quasi-luxuries and optimal wealth
accumulation
By using the optimal intertemporal consumption plan derived, let us exam-
ine the implication of consumers’ preferences for quasi-luxury goods x for
steady-state wealth holding and hence wealth accumulation. The relative
preferences for quasi-luxury goods are parameterized by ® (> 0), with which
the instantaneous utility function is re-speci…ed as
u = u (c; ®x) ;
where an increase in ® increases the marginal felicity ®ux for given ux.
The intratemporal marginal rate of substitution gx=gc in the steady state
is given by MRS(¹c; ¹x;®):
MRS (¹c; ¹x;®) =
®ux (¹c; ®¹x)¡ (u (¹c; ®¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x)) ±x (¹c; ¹x)
uc (¹c; ®¹x)¡ (u (¹c; ®¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x)) ±c (¹c; ¹x) : (14)
Parameter ® a¤ects the MRS through three channels: (i) by raising the
marginal felicity of x, ®ux for given ux; (ii) by lowering ux (¹c; ®¹x); and (iii)
by raising the utility level u (¹c; ®¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x). The e¤ects (i) and (iii) enhance
the MRS for x, whereas (ii) reduces it. Formally
@MRS (¹c; ¹x;®)
@®
T 0, (¤ ´) 1 + ®xuxx
ux
+
xgx
r
» T 0;
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where the three terms on the right-hand side represent the e¤ects (i) through
(iii), respectively. To consider upward shifts in quasi-luxury preferences, it
is assumed that the sum of (i) and (iii) dominates (ii):12
Assumption 3: An increase in ® enhances the MRS for x: ¤ > 0:
With this assumption, parameter ® is referred to as the degree of con-
sumers’ preferences for quasi-luxury goods x, or simply quasi-luxury prefer-
ence. By di¤erentiating (8) through (10) with respect to ®, the e¤ect of an
increase in the quasi-luxury preference on steady-state wealth holding can be
computed as
d¹a
d®
=
»ux¤
gcgxª
;
which is positive under Assumptions 2 and 3. The result can be summarized
as follows:
Proposition 3: An increase in the preference for quasi-luxury increases
optimal steady-state wealth holding and hence promotes optimal wealth accu-
mulation.
As explained in section 2.1, increasing quasi-luxury consumption in ex-
change for quasi-necessity consumption, maintaining the discount rate at r;
increases steady-state welfare and wealth holding, which results in Proposi-
tion 2. Intuitively, the preference for quasi-luxury goods induces a preference
for wealth.
Figure 2 illustrates the property. An increase in ® shifts the FF 0 schedule
upward, bringing the steady-state point from point E0 to E1. Since the
steady-state time preference curve RR0 is steeper than the budget lines E0A0
and E1A1, this shift increases steady-state total wealth from OA0 to OA1.
Transition dynamics are monotonic, as depicted by …gure 2. An increase
in quasi-luxury preference shifts the Engel curve counter-clockwise. Note
that consumers may instantly reduce quasi-luxuries x (0) as well as quasi-
necessities c (0) to enjoy more luxuries in the future steady state, as illus-
trated by the discrete jump from point E0 to E01 in …gure 2. Consumers
12However, if the felicity function u is speci…ed in the quadratic form: u = ¡12°ccc2 +
°cc¡ 12°xxx2 + ®x, where °c, °cc, and °xx are all positive, then MRS(¹c; ¹x;®) is de…nitely
increasing in ®, so that an increase in ® can be regarded as an upward shift of the preference
for x without any additional assumption.
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become more patient instantly with respect to either good and increase sav-
ings since (7) and (12) imply
d½x (0) =d® = ¡ gcgxx!
(gxx + p2gcc)
½
gcc (r ¡ !)
g2c
¡ »
¾
d¹a
d®
< 0;
and
d½c (0) =d® = ¡ g
2
xgcc!
gc (gxx + p2gcc)
½
gxx (r ¡ !)
g2x
+ »
¾
d¹a
d®
< 0:
As a result, for example, the life of a consumer with stronger preferences for
luxuries may be less luxurious in the short run than that of another with
weaker luxury preferences even when they hold the same amount of wealth.
In the interim run, both consumptions gradually increase up to the level at
point E1 as wealth is monotonically accumulated. Quasi-luxury consumption
at point E1 is larger than that at E0, whereas quasi-necessities consumption
at E1 is less than before. In the long run, a consumer with stronger luxury
preferences enjoys more wealth and a more luxurious life than another with
weaker preferences for luxury. These possibilities are consistent with the fact
that the lives of the wealthier and more luxurious are likely to have been less
luxurious than those of the poorer when they were young.
3 Growth
From Proposition 1, it could be conjectured that, in the context of economic
growth, the preference for quasi-luxuries promotes capital accumulation. Let
us next examine this problem by recasting the previous consumer model in
the neoclassical growth context.
Suppose that two goods are produced using capital and labor. The
production functions in the two sectors are given by the usual linearly-
homogeneous, concave functions F i (Ki; Li) (i = c; x), where Ki and Li
are the capital and labor employed by sector i, respectively. Labor is sup-
plied inelastically. The total amount of labor L is constant. The total
capital stock K accumulates from savings. To avoid complexities due to
inter-sectoral di¤erences in factor intensity, it is assumed that the two pro-
duction functions F i (Ki; Li) are similar in that the production functions
satisfy: F c (Kc; Lc) = BF (Kc; Lc) and F x (Kx; Lx) = F (Kx; Lx), where F
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is a linearly homogeneous concave function. Letting f (ki) be F (Ki; Li) =Li
with ki denoting Ki=Li, pro…t maximization yields:
w
r
=
f (kc)¡ kcf 0 (kc)
f 0 (kc)
=
f (kx)¡ kxf 0 (kx)
f 0 (kx)
;
and
w = B ff (kc)¡ kcf 0 (kc)g = p ff (kx)¡ kxf 0 (kx)g ;
where w and r are the wage rate and the capital rent, respectively. The …rst
equation implies
kc = kx = k;
where k ´ K=L represents the aggregate capital-labor ratio. The above
maximum pro…t condition thus implies
p = B and r = Bf 0 (k) : (15)
The relative price p is …xed by the productivity factor B.
The demand side is the same as in the previous section except that total
wealth a for the representative agent is speci…ed explicitly as the sum of the
per capita capital stock k as nonhuman wealth and the present value of the
wage income ‡ow as human wealth. The resultant optimal conditions are
essentially the same.
The market-clearing conditions depend on which good is accumulated as
capital goods. In either case, however, capital accumulation is generated by
the same aggregate equation,
_k = Bf (k)¡ c¡Bx; (16)
where (15) is substituted. To see this, consider the case in which good c is
used for both investment and consumption whereas good x is consumed for
the pure consumption purpose. Market equilibria are then expressed as
Blcf (k) = c+ _k;
and
(1¡ lc) f (k) = x;
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where lc ´ Lc=L represents the proportion of labor employed in sector c. By
multiplying the second equation by B, these equations can be aggregated
into (16). When good x is used for investment purposes, the _k term moves
to the right-hand side of the second equation, so that the same aggregation
again yields (16).
The equilibrium dynamics are obtained by combining the supply side,
represented by (15) and (16), and the demand side, described by (3), (5), (6),
and the transversality condition. As proven in Appendix B, the equilibrium
dynamics are uniquely given by a saddle time-path governed by a negative
root. Since the transition dynamics are monotonic, I focus on the steady-
state e¤ect of an increase in quasi-luxury preference ®. The steady-state
equilibrium
¡
¹c; ¹x; ¹k
¢
is determined by
± (¹c; ¹x) = Bf 0(¹k); (17)
gx (¹x; u (¹c; ®¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x))
gc (¹c; u (¹c; ®¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x))
= B; (18)
and
Bf
¡
¹k
¢
= ¹c+B¹x: (19)
Substituting (19) into (17) yields
± (¹c; ¹x) = Bf 0(f¡1 (¹c+B¹x)): (20)
The steady-state consumption basket (¹c; ¹x) is jointly determined by (18)
and (20). Capital stock ¹k is then given by (19). These relations can be
depicted precisely by reinterpreting …gure 1: the long-run time preference
schedule RR0 can be read as representing (20); the contract curve FF 0 as
(18); and the long-run budget schedule AA0 as (19). In particular, since
±c=±x > gc=gx = 1=B by Assumption 2, from (19) and (20), the slopes of
schedules RR0 and AA0 satisfy:¯¯¯¯
dx
dc
¯¯¯¯
RR0
¯¯¯¯
=
±c ¡ f 00= (Bf 0)
±x ¡ f 00= (f 0)
>
1
B
=
¯¯¯¯
dx
dc
¯¯¯¯
AA0
¯¯¯¯
;
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just as in section 2. Therefore, from the same discussion as for …gure 2, an
increase in quasi-luxury preference ® increases the steady-state capital stock
¹k : it shifts the FF 0 to the left, thereby increasing the total expenditures
¹c+B¹x from A0 to A1 and raising the steady-state capital stock.
Proposition 4: The greater is the preference ® for quasi-luxury, the more
steady-state capital is accumulated.
Proof. Di¤erentiating equations (18)-(20) with respect to ® yields
d¹k
d®
=
ux¤»
¢(f 0±x ¡ f 00) > 0;
where
¢ ´ 1
f 0±x ¡ f 00
½
gcgxª+ f
00
µ
gxx
gx
+
Bgcc
gc
¶¾
> 0:
Remark 2: From the continuity property, even if consumer i is less patient
than consumer j, in that ±i (c; x) > ±j (c; x)8 (c; x), the less-patient consumer
i will accumulate more steady-state capital than the more-patient consumer
j if consumer i’s quasi-luxury preference is su¢ciently larger than j’s.
Remark 3: When a one-factor production economy is considered, in which
goods are produced using only capital with constant-to-scale (i.e., linear in
this case) production functions, the interest rate r is also …xed by the produc-
tivity factor, say B, so that consumers have no interaction through markets.
As a result, Proposition 4 can be extended to the case of the N heterogeneous
agent economy: Suppose that there are N heterogeneous consumers, indexed
by n = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N with an identical utility-discounting function ± (c; x) and fe-
licity functions un (c; x) = u (c; ®nx). Then, a consumer with a stronger
luxury preference accumulates more steady-state capital in that:
®i > ®j , ¹Ki > ¹Kj 8i; j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N; i 6= j:
As can easily be conjectured from the above analysis, taxation on quasi-
luxury goods harms capital accumulation. To show this, consider a tax ¿
on quasi-luxury consumption x, assuming that the tax revenue ¿x is paid
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back to households in a lump-sum manner. Then, the …rst-order condition
between the two-good consumptions becomes
gx (x; Á)
gc (c; Á)
= (1 + ¿) p:
Since any other equilibrium conditions are unchanged, this implies that an
increase in the quasi-luxury tax ¿ has qualitatively the same e¤ect as a
decrease in quasi-luxury preference ®: it decreases the steady-state capital
stock ¹K. Figure 2 can be reinterpreted as illustrating this. A quasi-luxury
tax increase shifts the FF 0 schedule to the right, bringing the steady-state
point from E1 to E0:
4 Wealth distribution in a two-country world economy
Let us …nally examine the implication of quasi-luxury preferences for wealth
distribution. Consider a two-country world economy composed of home and
foreign countries, H and F. Foreign country variables are denoted by asterisks.
Any production activities are neglected for simplicity. The representative
agents in both countries are equally endowed with Y=2 and X=2 of the two
goods, quasi-necessity good c and quasi-luxury good x. Countries H and F
can freely trade these two goods at the world price p, and bonds b at the
world interest rate r. The household sector here is exactly the same as in
section 2 if total asset holding a in (4) is speci…ed by
a (t) = b (t) +
Z 1
t
Y + p (s)X
2
exp
µ
¡
Z s
t
r (¿ )
¶
d¿;
implying
_b (t) = r (t) b (t) + Y=2 + p (t)X=2¡ c (t)¡ p (t)x (t) : (21)
The market equilibrium conditions for the two goods and bonds are ex-
pressed as:
c (t) + c¤ (t) = Y;
x (t) + x¤ (t) = X;
and
b (t) + b¤ (t) = 0:
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By the Walrus law, when the two-good markets are in equilibrium for all t,
the international bond market is also in equilibrium. Given the time paths
of p (t) and r (t), the optimal consumption path fb (t) ; c (t) ; x (t) ; Á (t)g1t=0
for the representative agent in country H is determined by (3), (5), (6), and
(21), and that for country F by the corresponding equations with respect
to fb¤ (t) ; c¤ (t) ; x¤ (t) ; Á¤ (t)g. The equilibrium price path fp (t) ; r (t)g1t=0
is determined such that these optimal consumption paths satisfy the above
market-equilibrium conditions.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the two countries are initially identical
and hence that the initial equilibrium is autarchic. Using this framework, let
us examine the e¤ects of a permanent increase in country F’s preference for
quasi-luxury goods. Our main interest is to show that due to the resultant
stronger preference for quasi-luxury country F becomes wealthier than H in
the steady state. The initial autarchy equilibrium is constructed by assuming
the following:
Assumption 4: Both the felicity and subjective discount functions are ini-
tially identical between the two countries:
u¤ (c¤; x¤) = u (c¤; ®x¤) ; ±¤ (c¤; x¤) = ± (c¤; x¤) ;
where country F’s quasi-luxury preference ® initially equals one.
The steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is determined from
the following ten equations:
± (¹c; ¹x) = ± (¹c¤; ¹x¤) = ¹r; (22)
gx (¹x; u (¹c; ¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x))
gc (¹c; u (¹c; ¹x) =± (¹c; ¹x))
=
g¤x (¹x
¤; u¤ (¹c¤; ¹x¤) =± (¹c¤; ¹x¤))
g¤c (¹c¤; u¤ (¹c¤; ¹x¤) =± (¹c¤; ¹x¤))
= ¹p; (23)
¹r¹b(¤) + Y=2 + ¹pX=2 = ¹c(¤) + ¹p¹x(¤); (24)
¹Á
(¤)
=
u(¤)
¡
¹c(¤); ¹x(¤)
¢
± (¹c(¤); ¹x(¤))
;
and the market equilibrium conditions:
¹c+ ¹c¤ = Y; ¹x+ ¹x¤ = X:
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Due to Assumption 4 and the assumption of the symmetric supply sides, the
initial steady-state equilibrium (¹r0; ¹p0;¹b0; ¹c0; ¹x0; ¹Á0;¹b
¤
0; ¹c
¤
0; ¹x
¤
0;
¹Á
¤
0) is autarchic:
¹c0 = ¹c
¤
0 = Y=2; ¹x0 = ¹x
¤
0 = X=2;
¹b0 = ¹b
¤
0 = 0;
¹r0 = ± (Y=2;X=2) ; ¹p0 =
gx (X=2; u (Y=2;X=2) =± (Y=2; X=2))
gc (Y=2; u (Y=2; X=2) =± (Y=2; X=2))
;
and
¹Á0 = ¹Á
¤
0 = u (Y=2; X=2) =± (Y=2; X=2) :
It is useful to construct a box diagram, as in …gure 3, to depict the
determination of the steady-state equilibrium. Schedule RR0 represents the
downward-sloping curve that is obtained by eliminating ¹c¤ and ¹x¤ from (22)
using the market-clearing conditions, and schedule FF 0 the upward-sloping
curve obtained from (23) in the same way, respectively:
RR0 : ± (¹c; ¹x) = ± (Y ¡ ¹c;X ¡ ¹x) ; (25)
and
FF 0 : MRS (¹c; ¹x) = MRS¤ (Y ¡ ¹c;X ¡ ¹x;®) ; (26)
where the intratemporal MRS function MRS (¹c; ¹x;®) is de…ned by (14).
Schedules FF 0 and RR0, the two-country versions of FF 0 and RR0 in …g-
ure 1, could be regarded as the intratemporal and intertemporal steady-
state contract curves, respectively. The equilibrium consumption allocation
(¹c; ¹x; ¹c¤; ¹x¤) is determined at the intersection E of the two contract curves.
Given point E, consider the steady-state indi¤erence curve I (E), de…ned by
(11). ¹p is then determined as the gradient of the curve at E. As discussed in
section 2, by Assumption 2, the intertemporal contract curve RR0 is steeper
than the indi¤erence curve I (E) at E. Recall that this is the key property of
quasi-luxuries that have produced Propositions 3 and 4. Furthermore, it can
be shown that the equilibrium time-path of the economy around the steady
state is uniquely given by a saddle path governed by a negative root (see
Appendix C for the proof). The same discussion as in the previous sections
can thus be applied to obtain the implication of the quasi-luxury preference.
Suppose that country F’s preference ® for quasi-luxury goods increases.
As depicted by …gure 4, it shifts the intratemporal contract FF 0 to the right,
bringing the steady-state point from point E0 to E1. For country H, the
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new consumption basket is below the initial indi¤erence curve I (E0), imply-
ing that its steady-state welfare deteriorates. Accordingly, the steady-state
wealth holding of country H decreases, whereas that of country F increases,
as depicted by the change from point A0 to A1. This can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 5: The country with a stronger preference for quasi-luxury
holds more wealth in the steady state than the other country with a weaker
preference.
Proof. Equations (22)-(24) yield:
d¹b
d®
= ¡d
¹b¤
d®
= ¡ ux»
2ªgcgx
¤ < 0:
An increase in country F’s preferences for quasi-luxury raises the relative
price p of the quasi-luxury good. In country H, to raise the marginal rate
of substitution gx
¡
¹x; ¹Á
¢
=gc
¡
¹c; ¹Á
¢
of the quasi-luxury up to the higher p, the
representative agent shifts consumption away from the quasi-luxury good to
the quasi-necessity. It should take place along the intertemporal contract
curve, i.e., the quasi-luxury consumption should be reduced in exchange for
the quasi-necessity at the rate of dx=dc = ±c=±x (see (8)), which, for given
levels of ¹b and, hence, ¹Á, is larger than required to equalize gx
¡
¹x; ¹Á
¢
=gc
¡
¹c; ¹Á
¢
to p. To reduce the MRS for quasi-luxury down to p, steady-state welfare
¹Áand, hence, the underlying wealth holdings ¹b should decrease. From the
market clearing conditions, country F’s consumption of the quasi-luxury good
increases and that of the quasi-necessity decreases. Its wealth holdings ¹b¤
should increase to …nance more quasi-luxuries than before.
As in the previous section, the following result can also be obtained from
the continuity property of the steady-state solution with respect to preference
parameters.
Corollary 1: Even when there is an international di¤erence in the steady-
state time preference (utility-discounting functions), the less-patient country
can have more wealth in the steady state than the more-patient one if the
less-patient one has su¢ciently stronger preference for quasi-luxury.
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5 Conclusions
There is an old idea that certain goods are related to wealth accumulation.
I have provided a model to formalize the idea by incorporating weakly non-
separable preferences. The model helps to understand luxury consumption
from a dynamic viewpoint. The phenomenon that wealthier agents consume
more luxuries can be described by stating that the consumers are wealthier
because they prefer luxuries (quasi-luxuries). A new insight is that wealth
accumulation should re‡ect consumers’ preferences for various kinds of goods
as well as for time.
There are several ways in which the above analysis can be extended. First,
it should be extended to the case of more than two goods. Quasi-luxury goods
are de…ned here in terms of the MRS between two goods. With more than
two goods, some other devices would be required. Second, empirical testing
of our model should be conducted. The model could be hypothesized by
the property that di¤erences in commodity-speci…c time preferences between
luxury and necessity goods depend on wealth accumulation. This could be
done by estimating the commodity-speci…c Euler equations.
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Appendices
A Coe¢cient matrix A in section 2.2
A ´
0BBB@
¡ »g2x
gxx
gc
gcc
³
g2x»
2
gxx
+ r±c
gc
´
0
¡gc
³
1 + p2 gcc
gxx
´
r + »g
2
x
gxx
0
¡
³
1 + p2 gcc
gxx
´
p »gx
gxx
r
1CCCA : (27)
B Dynamics of the growth model in section 3
This appendix proves that the equilibrium dynamics in the growth model in
section 3 can be obtained as a saddle time-path around steady state. The
equilibrium dynamics for (c; k; p; r; x; Á) are generated by (3), (5), (6), (15),
(16) and the transversality condition. The system can be reduced to:
_c = ¡ gc
gcc
(Bf 0(k)¡ ½c(c; x; Á));
_Á = u(c; ®x)¡ Á±(c; x);
_k = Bf (k)¡ c¡Bx:
Substituting (5) for x in the above system yields an autonomous di¤erential
equation system with respect to h = (c; Á; k). The resulting system can be
linearized as _h = Gh^, where
G =
0BBB@
¡ »g2x
gxx
; gc
gcc
³
g2x»
2
gxx
+ r±c
gc
´
; ¡ gc
gcc
Bf 00
¡gc
³
1 +B2 gcc
gxx
´
; r + »g
2
x
gxx
; 0
¡
³
1 +B2 gcc
gxx
´
; B »gx
gxx
; r
1CCCA :
The trace of G equals 2r. Its determinant can be computed as
detG = ¡ g
2
cg
2
x
gccgxx
ª¡ rBgcf
00
gcc
µ
1 +B2
gcc
gxx
¶
< 0;
implying that the equilibrium dynamics are saddle-point stable. It can be
shown that the two positive roots are inconsistent with the transversality
condition.
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C Dynamics of the two-country model in section 4
With the steady-state equilibrium being given above, the local dynamic sys-
tem for m ´ (c; Á; Á¤; b) can be obtained as
_m (t) = Dm^ (t) ; (28)
D =
0BBBBBB@
¡ »g2x
gxx
gc
2gcc
³
g2x»
2
gxx
+ r±c
gc
´
¡ gc
2gcc
³
g2x»
2
gxx
+ r±c
gc
´
0
¡gc
³
1 + p2 gcc
gxx
´
r + »g
2
x
2gxx
¡ »g2x
2gxx
0
gc
³
1 + p2 gcc
gxx
´
¡ »g2x
2gxx
r + »g
2
x
2gxx
0
¡
³
1 + p2 gcc
gxx
´
p »gx
2gxx
¡p »gx
2gxx
r
1CCCCCCA :
The linear system can be reduced in the form of a block-structure by
using the di¤erence Á¡ of the two countries’ welfare levels and their average
Á+:13
Á¡ =
Á¡ Á¤
2
; Á+ =
Á+ Á¤
2
; (29)
as, for h ´ (c; Á¡; b; Á+),
_h (t) = Hh^ (t) : (30)
H =
µ
A 0
0 r
¶
;
where A is matrix (27) describing the local dynamics for individuals’ optimal
consumption in section 2. As can easily be seen, H has three positive roots
and one negative root and the negative root is the same as ! in section 2.14
The resultant equilibrium path is also very similar to that obtained in (12):
_b (t) = !b^ (t) ; b^ (0) = b0 ¡ ¹b;
c^ (t) = ¡c^¤ (t) = g
2
x
(gxx + p2gcc)
½
gxx (r ¡ !)
g2x
+ »
¾
b^ (t) ;
x^ (t) = ¡x^¤ (t) = gxgc
(gxx + p2gcc)
½
gcc (r ¡ !)
g2c
¡ »
¾
b^ (t) ;
Á^ (t) = ¡Á^¤ = gcb^ (t) :
13For this procedure, see Aoki (1981).
14The magnitude of ! is di¤erent from that in section 2 because the points at which !
is evaluated are di¤erent.
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Figure 2. Quasi-Luxury Preference and Optimum Wealth Accumulation 
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Figure 3. Two-Country Equilibrium 
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Figure 4. Quasi-Luxury Preference and Wealth Distribution 
 
 
